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Resumo
Empresas Estatais Empresas estatais e investimento 
estrangeiro em infraestrutura no Brasil após a 
crise financeira internacional de 2008.  O artigo 
tem como objetivo analisar a participação de 
BNDES, Eletrobras e de investidores estrangeiros 
em megaprojetos de infraestrutura no Brasil após 
a crise financeira internacional de 2008. A pesquisa 
adota uma perspectiva heterodoxa, de inspiração 
keynesiana e institucionalista, para realizar uma 
análise empírica de recorte setorial, utilizando a 
base de dados do Banco Mundial sobre participação 
privada em infraestrutura. Os resultados 
demonstram que os dez maiores projetos realizados 
no setor elétrico brasileiro após 2008 tiveram a 
participação de capital estrangeiro, sendo que oito 
contaram com a participação do BNDES e seis com a 
participação da Eletrobras.       
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Abstract
The article aims to analyze the participation 
of BNDES, Eletrobras and foreign investors in 
infrastructure megaprojects in Brazil after the 
2008 international financial crisis. The research 
adopts a heterodox, Keynesian and institutionalist 
perspective, to conduct an empirical analysis, 
using the World Bank’s database on private 
participation in infrastructure. The results show 
that the ten largest projects carried out in the 
Brazilian electricity sector after 2008 had the 
participation of foreign capital, of which eight 
had the participation of BNDES and six with the 
participation of Eletrobras.
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the state and market presents particularities regarding 
the development of arrangements for investments in infrastructure. In this sense, 
state-owned companies are important instruments of interaction between the public 
and private spheres, since they have a relevant economic role in several countries. 
Due to their corporate and public nature, they are related market structures and 
financial stability, as well as the public budget and implementation of economic policy 
measures. Therefore, they are able to fulfil different functions to stimulate private 
investment, whether in structuring financing, investing in partnership with other 
groups or even individually.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2018), in the recent period, the participation of state-owned enterprises has 
increased even in international trade and investment. In 2015, all OECD member 
and guest countries (except China) had 2,467 state-owned enterprises, with an 
estimated market value of about $ 2.4 trillion and over 9 million employees. China can 
be considered as a separated universe due to the size and number of state-owned 
companies: in 2015, it had 51,000 state-owned companies, totalling $ 20.0 trillion in 
market value and 20 million employees (OECD, 2017).
The need to manage infrastructure investments as public policies, which means, 
within the logic of planning, requires attention to costs, but also the results for economic 
and social development. The state must, therefore, be able to pursue projects that 
are fundamental to the country’s development and create efficient instruments for 
attracting and managing (or even investing directly), as well as setting priorities. At the 
same time, dealing with interests of this magnitude implies understanding the diverse 
conjunctures and portfolio strategies of major investors. It follows that, from time to 
time, domestic and international investors are more (or less) likely to invest in certain 
assets, depending on their risks and returns
However, the role, which for many years was restricted to the state, including 
through state-owned enterprises, became gradually to be “transferred” to private 
actors in a variety of modalities. Thus, privatization, public concessions with different 
financing mechanisms, and various types of public-private partnerships (PPP) were 
stimulated to leverage large infrastructure projects. Moreover, the limitation posed by 
the need for prior expertise and the ability to mobilize large amounts of capital, limited 
a portion of these resources to foreign investors (via large sector players), especially in 
developingcountries
In the case of Brazil, there was a peculiar movement in the post-international crisis: 
a considerable increase in foreign investment in the country and private participation 
in infrastructure. According to the perspective adopted in this article, this situation may 
be related to the role that state-owned companies played in arrangements. Therefore, 
it is considered that investigating the logic of such investments may shed light on 
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the current debate about what role the state, and especially state-owned enterprises, 
should play within a development strategy.
The article is separate into three sections, besides the introduction and the 
conclusion. Initially, a brief theoretical review of Keynesian and institutionalist 
inspiration focusing on the relationship between state and market in contemporary 
capitalism. The following describes the scope and research methodology. The last 
section presents the results  
STATE, MARKET, INSTITUTIONALITY AND VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM
In order to understand the constitutive - and therefore not antagonistic - nature 
between the state and the market and the importance of both in the process of 
developing countries finds, some authors can give a robust theoretical basis. Polanyi’s 
(2001) critique of the belief that both national societies and the global economy find 
its equilibrium through the so-called self-regulation of markets is unique in this regard. 
The state would play a major role in the supply of money and credit, for example, 
and the conflict between the expansive tendencies of self-regulating markets and 
defensive political measures (of resistance and containment) would start from a 
dialectical perspective, and its conditioning are historically constructed.
The contradictory development of economies would result from the simultaneous 
existence of both (state and market) and the action provoked by economic liberalism, 
confronted with the principle of social protection and productive organization. The 
centrality of organization, regulation, and control exercised by states would thus be 
inherent in systemic logic, not the opposite. In short, there is no realism in resign State 
as a mere broker of the so-called “market failures”, since it is the entity that establishes 
the institutional framework in which economic processes develops.
Nevertheless, after a period where state coordination in the economic process 
was paramount (starting in the post-World War II until the mid-1970s), there was a 
movement in which various currents of liberal revisionism converged on a “definitive” 
pattern of the object of study and methodology of Macroeconomics centred on the 
role of the market (WOODFORD, 2009). Based on models of intertemporal general 
equilibrium, backed on microeconomics fundamentals, these theoretical strands 
departs by the basic assumption that only the freely acting market would allocate 
resources as best as possible towards a long-term general equilibrium. In this 
perspective, monetary policy would be the most effective instrument of economic 
policy (mainly to control inflation), and it is not for the state to resort to fiscal policy - 
or other spending instruments - to try to leverage the economy - as they would only 
generate allocative distortions.
By the early 1990s, developed countries had already broadened into this 
perspective, but it was not until the second half of the decade that this movement 
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reached most of the developing countries. In this period, financial globalization has 
made in fact, the capital market as the essence of modern capitalism (TORRES, 2013). 
Market deregulation and widespread capital mobility meant that adjustments came 
almost instantaneously, giving a new face to short and long-term investments. Even 
so, the insertion of the various economies and the deconstruction of the states - as 
we knew before- occurred in a non-homogeneous way, generating vulnerabilities and 
different opportunities regarding potential interventions in the economy.
Financial openness raised interest rates to another dimension for external 
equilibrium, and rate differentials became a centrepiece for understanding flows. Such 
a feature would derive from the value reserve function of the different currencies, a 
function that has gained even more importance in a context of exacerbation of the 
financial sphere. Due to the so-called opportunity cost, it becomes almost natural 
to feedback on the currencies that are appreciating, generating a reallocation of 
portfolios and strengthening the hierarchy between them (DE CONTI, PRATES AND 
PLIHON, 2013, P.30).
From the perspective of financial globalization, leave the state “out” of what was for 
decades under its purview (which includes undertaking large infrastructure projects) 
would require a greater presence of private capital in “low-return” investments and 
would require maturing long-term in specific arrangements. Thus, by using resources 
more “efficiently”, it would be possible to carry out a great number of projects, as well 
as freeing public resources for other priority expenditures. If the application of such 
prescriptions would have the potential to create considerable disruption in developed 
countries, transposing them - uncritically - into developing countries (with weaker 
states and less developed markets), would naturallygenerategreater obstacles, which 
includes: 
1. The presumption that there is a hydraulic functioning of the economy and 
that market structures are given in time and space; 
2. The belief that short, medium and long term fluctuations would not generate 
“differentiated” unpredictability from country to country and; 
3. Relegating a secondary role to the state, little attention would be paid to 
the perception that materializing large-scale investments would depend on 
designing them as a public policy perspective (conforming and shaping the 
institutionality of each country).
Faced with these challenges, the theoretical perspective adopted in this paper 
has a more realistic approach. As institutions are (necessarily) the result of social 
processes, the different market mechanisms are also creations of this nature and it has 
influencesin economic processes. However, they are not the only ones and, therefore, 
has to be faced taking the complexity of the modus operandi of the economy in each 
jurisdiction.
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The Keynesian approach that individual agent’s decisions start from subjective 
beliefs about the future would thus be the most appropriate. Given the impossibility 
of holding all the information and given that the world is complex and dynamic, 
uncertainty would be an intrinsic feature of a monetary economy of production. 
Because of this, the institutions develop itself to reduce different uncertainties, 
depending on the characteristics of the country and conjunctures.
The logic of advancing resources in a monetary production economy derives from 
the borrower’s future income expectations and the risk-return expectations - for those 
who acquire the created assets. According to Studart (1993, p. 102), the role of the 
financial system in the post-Keynesian view is more complex and essential than that of 
a simple broker between investors and savers. In this sense, there is a need for a stable 
institutional environment to allow stable financial growth, and the existence of long-
term financing mechanisms, which not always happen through market forces.
In the case of long-term investments, given the inherent risks of maturity mismatch, 
as the timing of borrowing and return, it generates greater risks. Thus, the existence 
of appropriate markets and/or institutions can provide the foundation for financially 
solid growth. In other words, funding is central to making longer-term investments 
and doing so through private mechanisms, has limitations in each jurisdiction, which 
may require alternative ways to avoid mismatches.
Moreover, it is part of the essence of modern capitalism that agents may incur risks 
linked to the very nature of investments, as developed by Minsky (1986) and known as 
the Financial Instability Hypothesis. In general, there would be an inherent tendency 
in modern monetary economies, depending on the duration of a country’s economic 
stability, for agents to allow themselves to take more risks, and a reversal of this stability 
could undermine the ability of the most indebted firms to renegotiate their liabilities.
Regarding theinstitutionalist approach, it is associated with the concept of 
perpetuity and stability of institutions, where rules, norms and procedures are 
defined, in a way to structure interactions between agents (HODGSON, 2006). In this 
sense, they can sometimes embarrass, sometimes stimulate actions, since they guide 
expectations and uncertainties. From this perspective Evans (2003) criticizes what he 
called “institutional monoculture”, capable of transcending national circumstances, 
politically and geographically. according to the author, “[a] institutional monoculture’s 
not only has few possibilities to solve local governance problems; It also has the 
potential to make financial lending less effective” (EVANS, 2003, p. 50)
Under a state conception of Weberian “rationality,” such institutionality develops 
into explicit regulations and interventions within their legal domain. Thus, the State 
acts in a continuous undertaking of public functions instituted by laws and distributed 
in differentiated competences. In addition, behaves historically in evolution, that is, 
changes in parallel with the development of the modern financial economy – even 
without direct causality. 
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Therefore, in the “financialization” process, it is not possible to understand it only 
from the perspective of the market, but taking into account the state’s responses 
(AKYÜZ, 1993). Given that, the development trajectories adopted by countries are 
diverse and shaped by a symbiosis of the relationship between the state and the 
market and by systemic structures and conjunctures. Therefore, it would not be 
possible to form a single model of capitalism, but of varieties of capitalism (HALL & 
SOSKICE, 2001).
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL AFTER THE 
2008 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: SCOPE AND 
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
Infrastructure investments have direct and indirect influence on economic and 
social development, with relevant impacts on the economic level activity, productivity 
and, therefore, on economic growth (CALDERÓN & SERVÉN, 2003; ESTACHE & FAY, 
2007). Not surprisingly, the topic of infrastructure, as well as its financing, has taken a 
centre stage in recent G-20 meetings. According to the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB):
Policymaking processes, like policies, are very complex. Multiple actors with 
diverse powers, time horizons, and incentives interact in various arenas. There are 
diverse rules of engagement which can have an impact on the way the game is 
played. For these reasons, it is not possible to fully understand these processes by 
focusing on a few institutional characteristics […]. (IADB, 2006. p. 30) 
Such enterprises are natural monopolies with high scale gains, capital-intensive 
activities in the implementation phase and have a high sunk cost. Thus, they are part 
of a list of possible interventions of command and control by the public entity, as the 
definition of the equity concentration degree, debt, regulation, among others. In many 
cases, it also requires direct state action (giving guarantees), as in projects with the 
participation of state-owned enterprises.
At the same time, contractual specificities are key to addressing and tracking issues 
such as cost, regulation and any eventual re-negotiation needs. Thus, privatization of 
infrastructure assets, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or even concessions of various 
types - including Special-Purpose Entities (SPEs), can develop in dialogue with the 
specificities listed above. SPE is a business modality that seeks to isolate risks, as well 
as to prevent managers from having discretion about the use of cash flow, allowing 
the regulator to have accurate financial information. In the case of financing, Project 
Finance is the most common mechanism for structuring a project in which the financier 
and the investor (sponsor) are legally independent. That is, assumes the cash flow - 
in addition to project assets -, are a primary source of funding guarantee (SIFFERT 
et al, 2009).
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From the 2000s, the logic of adapting large projects to the new financial reality 
has become more latent and initiatives have multiplied worldwide, according to 
Word Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI). However, unlike what might be 
assumed, given the increased degree of uncertainty, it was in the years following the 
2008 crisis that these projects increased most. It is also from this period that there was 
a substantial increase in foreign investment inflows to Brazil.
According to World Bank data, between 2008 and 2017, PPI in Brazil reached US$ 
257 billion (635 projects), of which US$ 135.8 billion (426 projects) in the electricity 
sector. The post-crisis PPI volume (up to 2014) even exceeded the amount of PPI during 
the privatization process that took place in the country in the second half of the 1990s.
Source: World Bank and IPEADATA - self-elaboration. 
Graph 1. Private Participation in Infrastructure and Foreign Direct Investment inflow,  
Brazil, 1995-2017, current US$ million
As can be seen in Graph, although PPI registered a significant decrease from 
2014, the FDI inflow remains at a high level. One possible explanation is that, in the 
recent period (under the context of the political and economic crisis) privatization and 
concessions program adopted by Michel Temer´s administration in 2016, much of the 
capital inflow has been reported for investments in form of merger and acquisition. 
It should be remembered that this type of transaction (brownfield) is less related to 
economic dynamics than greenfield projects, which have the greatest impact on the 
level of investment (constitution of assets), employment and income generation, 
productivity, and therefore for economic growth.
Public investment also made an important contribution to the economic 
performance of the country until the 2015 crisis. According to Orair et al (2018), in the 
period 2007-2010, public sector investments and federal state-owned companies grew 
at an average annual rate of 17.0% and 23.0%, respectively. Nevertheless, the level of 
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public investment in infrastructure, which averaged 2.2% of GDP per year over the last 
decade, insufficient to compensate capital depreciation (PEREIRA & PUGA, 2016).
In the case of the electricity sector, since the mid-2000s, the Economic and 
Social National Development Bank (BNDES) and Eletrobras, in addition withseveral 
institutional and regulatory changes, have contributed to the strong expansion of 
private investment in infrastructure. According to Werner (2017), the improvement 
of the regulatory framework in 2004 contributed to minimize risks and generate 
greater capacity to originate and plan projects. Law 10,847 (which created the Energy 
Research Company) and Law 11,079 (which established general rules for bidding and 
contracting PPPs) were essential to leverage investments in the sector. The requirement 
to set up SPE allowed financing through Project Finance’s financial engineering. Most 
recently, Law 12,431 created the so-called Infrastructure Equity Investment Funds 
and Law 12,766 amended the previous legislation, including variable remuneration 
mechanisms, innovations concerning the partnership guarantee fund. It is also worth 
mentioning Brazilian institutionality in the sector, formed by the National Council of 
Energy Policy, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the National Electric Energy Agency, 
the Electric Energy Trading Chamber, the Electric Sector Monitoring Committee and 
National Electric System Operator.
According to Graph 2, the BNDES disbursements for the electricity sector increased 
from 2006 to 2014. In the case of Eletrobras, it is possible to observe the significant 
growth of investment in the period from 2008 to 2013 and a very sharp fall from 2015. 
Eletrobras’s investment policy in partnership with other groups led the state-owned 
company to register participation in more than 170 SPEs, a modality that accounted 
for about half of the group’s investment in the period.
Graph 2. Participation of BNDES and Eletrobras in the Brazilian  
electricity sector, 2004-2017, current R$ million
Source: BNDES and Ministério do Planejamento do Brasil – self-elaboration.
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The delimitation of the object of research is to understand the logic behind these 
investments, especially in the context of exacerbation of the degree of uncertainty 
arising from the international financial crisis. The proposed methodology is an 
empirical analysis, by sectoral cut, of the ten largest projects carried out in the Brazilian 
electricity sector. The source of the data is the World Bank’s database on private 
participation in infrastructure. From this data, it is possible to identify, for example, 
the fixed value in capital assets, the agents involved (investors and financiers), the 
nationality of the agents, among other information. In addition, we investigate the 
financial statements of each firm in order to detail the information on the corporate 
structures of the projects and their respective participants.
4. STATE-OWNED COMPANIES AND FOREIGN PARTICIPATION 
IN MEGA PROJECTS CARRIED OUT IN THE BRAZILIAN 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR AFTER THE 2008 CRISIS
Considering the survey data, the ten largest private equity holdings (Greenfield 
modality) in the Brazilian electricity sector totalized US$ 38.7 billion, representing over 
30% of the total PPI registered in the country. Table 1 (below) provides a summary of 
the survey results. Most of the projects took place between 2009 and 2012, derived by 
the constitution of SPEs and using the Project Finance financing modality.











1º Belo Monte 
(generation)
2012 14.800 13.415 49,90% Spain (10%)
2º Santo Antônio 
(generation) 
2009 6.800 3.100 43,00% Spain (10%); 
Portugal (10%)
3º Jirau (generation) 2009 5.300 4.800 40,00% France (40%);
Japan (20%)
4º Brookfield (generation) 2010 2.241 n.d. - Canada (100%)
5º TelesPieres (generation) 2012 1.896 1.510 49,20% Spain (51%)
6º IEMA (transmision) 2012 1.793 Sim 49,00% Colombia (51%)
7º Belo Monte 
(transmision)
2017 1.762 1.140 49,00% China (51%)
8º Parnaiba (generation) 2011 1.634 700 - Germany (30%)
9º Porto Pecen 
(generation)
2009 1.400 Sim - Germany (22%); 
Portugal (50%)
10º Tucurui – Oriximana 
(transmision)
2010 1.109 - - Espanha (100%)
Table 1. Ten largest private Investments in the Brazilian  
electric sector, Greenfield Modality, 2008-2017
Source: World Bank e CompaniesAccounting Statements– self-elaboration. 
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According to this Table, all projects had foreign participation,tottalingeight 
nationalities. In this regard, at least three aspects are important to highlight:
1. The foreign companies participating in these projects are major players in 
the world energy sector and many of them have an important participation 
in Brazil, such as Neonergia - Iberdrola (Spain), Brookfield (Canada), Engie 
(France) and State Grid (China).
2. Some of them are State-Owned (State Grid) or have the state ownership, 
directly from the state or by another state enterprise. These are the cases of 
the French group Engie, in which the French state is the largest shareholder; 
and the Portuguese group Electricity of Portugal (EDP), where the largest 
shareholder is the Chinese state-owned company China Three Gorges (CTG).
3. It is possible to identify the strong and widespread presence of Investment 
Funds in the ownership composition of these corporations - a striking feature 
of the current stage of the financial globalization process. Neoenergia, 
for example, has a stake in Previ (Banco do Brasil Investment Fund), while 
Iberdrola, the company´s controller has, as the largest shareholders, the 
BlackRock Investment Fund and Qatar Sovereign Fund (Qatar Investment 
Authority). Those funds are also part of the shareholding structure of the 
Portuguese group EDP.
Given those information, it would be possible to affirm, for example, that the 7th 
ranking venture, Belo Monte Transmission, despite being listed in the World Bank 
database as private participation in infrastructure, is, in fact, a purely state venture, since 
all participating companies are state-owned: two national (BNDES and Eletrobras) and 
one foreign (State Grid). In the case of the 9th ranking venture, Porto Pecen, it can be 
considered that the foreign participation of the Portuguese group EDP represents a 
Chinese state-owned company (CTG), there is an American Investment Fund and also 
the Qatar Sovereign Fund. 
Regarding national state participation, BNDES participated in eight projects, 
of which the amount financed exceeded US$ 25.0 billion. Eletrobras registered 
participation in six projects (the largest ones), through its subsidiaries: Chesf, 
Eletronorte, Eletrosul and Furnas. In addition, it was possible to identify other national 
state holdings: the Minas Gerais State Electric Power Company (CEMIG) in the Belo 
Monte hydroelectric power plant, and the Banco da Amazônia (BASA) in the Tucurui-
Orixamana transmission line.
Finally, as an illustration of the complexity and diversity of agents participating 
in these projects, it is worth mentioning some aspects presented in the case study of 
the Teles Pires hydroelectric dam, elaborated by Vazquez, Hallack and Queiroz (2016). 
In summary, the Teles Pires Energia Efficient Consortium, consisting of Neoenergia/
Iberdrola, Eletrobras/Eletrosul, Eletrobras/Furnas and Odebrecht Energia, won the 
auction held by Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) in 2010. The SPE Companhia Hidrelétrica 
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Teles Pires S/A, for the construction, assembly, operation and maintenance activities 
of the plant’s generation facilities. Another consortium, formed by the companies 
Odebrecht Energia, Voith, Alston, PCE and Intertechne, had beenstructured under EPC 
(engineering, procurement and construction) to carry out the project and civil works, 
as well as supply and assemble the electromechanical equipment of the enterprise
In the financial plan, resources of R$ 3.6 billion were leveraged in three financing 
levels: (i) long-term financing; (ii) equity financing and (iii) short-term financing 
through bridge loans. Long-term funds were obtained from the BNDES Finem and 
BNDES Finame financing lines, with a 20-year amortization term. Financing of R$ 1.2 
billion was stipulated and a transfer of R$ 2.4 billion (besides R$ 450 million for the 
short term). Twenty-year simple private debentures amounting R$ 650 million were 
also issued, the only buyer of which was the Caixa Econômica Federal State Investment 
Fund (Vazquez; Hallack and Queiroz, 2016,P.30).
CONCLUSION
The objective of the paper was to analyze the participation of state-owned and 
foreign companies in infrastructure investments in Brazil after de recent International 
Crisis. To this end, a Keynesian and institutionalist perspective on financing and 
investment in infrastructure sector was adopted. Given the specificities and the 
long-time horizon of this type of investment, it was argued about the need for a - de 
facto - constitutive relationship between the state and market for the proper 
development of arrangements that enable the mobilization of large volumes of capital. 
It has been assumed that the development trajectories adopted by the countries 
are diverse and shaped by a symbiosis of both and by the systemic structures and 
conjunctures.
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